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I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy law has been an instrument of social change. Privacybased legal arguments have been used to support progressive claims
that government must cease to criminalize morally controversial per1
sonal choices. But privacy law has also been an effective instrument
*
1

Anita L. Allen, J.D., Ph.D., is the Henry R. Silverman Professor of Law and Professor of
Jurisprudence at the University of Pennsylvania.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160–63 (1973) (holding that the fundamental right to
privacy demands abolishing state laws that categorically criminalize abortion practices
which were rejected by some but not all ethicists and religious groups). But see ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 110 (1990)
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of social stasis. Privacy-based legal arguments have been used to support conservative claims that neither government nor fellow citizens
can interfere with traditional practices merely for the sake of progres2
sive ideas about marriage, family, social life, or citizenship. To illustrate these points, I explore themes of social progress and social sta3
sis through an examination of First Amendment privacy doctrines.
The Supreme Court has identified associational privacy, informational privacy, anonymity, and privacies of religion, thought, and intellect
as requirements of the First Amendment, giving rise to a robust First
4
Amendment jurisprudence of privacy and private choice.
The concept of privacy plays a major role in the jurisprudence of
the First but also the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Here, I focus on the First Amendment. First Amendment
privacy law is an especially rich context for freshly assessing the past

2

3

4

(suggesting that the “right of privacy” invented by the Warren Court matured into a judicial power to dictate moral codes).
See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 459 (1868) (“We will not inflict upon society the
greater evil of raising the curtain upon domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifling violence.”).
The Amendment provides that: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Amendment applies to
Congress, but also to state lawmakers. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925)
(“[W]e . . . assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by the
First Amendment from abridgement by Congress—are among the fundamental personal
rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from impairment by the States.”). Courts and parties before them have introduced the
First Amendment guarantees of religion, free expression, and peaceable assembly on behalf of interests in spiritual life, private thought, anonymity, and exclusive group association. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209–10 (1972) (upholding the ability of
the Amish religion to reject competitive, material life in favor of simple, spiritual existence lived in harmony with nature), Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969)
(upholding petitioners assertion of a “right to read or observe what he pleases--the right
to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home”), NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63 (1958) (requiring NAACP to produce
membership list to state is a substantial restraint on freedom of association and would adversely affect members’ ability to foster their beliefs due to fear of exposure and consequent reprisal); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 580–81 (1995) (excluding those whose views are at odds with parade organizers is a
permissible expressive freedom of speech).
See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (holding that a
state may not ban anonymous political literature opposing taxes); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234
(holding that a state may not require members of the Amish faith to send children to
school pursuant to compulsory schooling laws that violated their religious beliefs); Stanley,
394 U.S. at 568 (holding that criminalizing the mere possession of obscene material in
the home is prohibited by the First and Fourteenth Amendment); Patterson, 357 U.S. at
466 (holding that a state may not require organization to reveal names of its rank-and-file
members).
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success and future potential of privacy concept-based jurisprudence
as an instrument of progressive social change for African Americans,
women, and gay, lesbian, and bisexual Americans. In First Amendment cases, judicial application of concepts of associational privacy,
informational privacy, Internet anonymity, and intellectual privacy
have often furthered the ends of tolerance, respect for individuals,
5
and equality. But those same concepts of privacy have been applied
in First Amendment cases to, in effect, preserve the status quo of intolerance, disrespect, and inequality. Indeed, in the First Amendment
arena, historically subordinated groups and those hostile to the
equality and dignity of historically subordinated groups have likewise
claimed privacies of free association, exclusive association, and anonymous speech to further their ends. As a legal tool, First Amendment privacy jurisprudence is aptly likened to the proverbial doubleedged sword, an attractive but perilous weapon when deployed either
by socially liberal or socially conservative idealists. Privacy law must
be understood both as an instrument of progress and change for the
better and as an instrument of stasis and change for the worse.
II. PRIVACY AND THE CONSTITUTION
The word “privacy” does not appear in the original eighteenthcentury U.S. Constitution or in any of its twenty-seven eighteenth, ni6
neteenth, or twentieth century Amendments. Little can be made of
7
its absence. That is because, although the Founders and Framers did
not include the word “privacy” in the text of the written constitution,
rich conceptions of privacy are implicit in any plausible renderings of
the text. That privacy and private property are implicit constitutional
values is strongly reflected in the Third Amendment’s limit on government access to private houses: “No Soldier shall, in time of peace
be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in

5

6

7

Examples of such cases are focal points of this Article and will include Patterson, 357 U.S.
at 466 (holding that a state may not demand membership list of civil rights group dedicated to African American equality) and Wallace v. Brewer, 315 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala.
1970) (finding that a state may not demand names and registration of members of a Nation of Islam group that purchased land in state).
See generally Anita L. Allen, Constitutional Law and Privacy, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 145 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2d ed. 2010) (advancing argument
repeated here that protection for privacy is implicit in explicit in nation's founding principles and Bill of Rights).
Cf. Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 69
(2011) (“The text of the Constitution may say a lot, but it does not say everything one
needs to know to resolve all possible cases and controversies.”).
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time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.” That privacy
is a constitutional value is also strongly reflected in the Fourth
9
Amendment. Recognizing a proper sphere of household, social, and
work product privacy, the Fourth Amendment asserts that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
10
the persons or things to be seized.

The Fifth Amendment shelters private thoughts and belief by limiting
the government’s power to compel persons to provide evidence
against themselves that would lead to their prosecution in a criminal
proceeding: “[N]or shall any person . . . be compelled in any crimi11
nal case to be a witness against himself.” The Ninth Amendment
guarantee of unenumerated rights acknowledges deeply rooted traditions of non-interference with decision making about personal life:
“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
12
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”
In the eighteenth century, as now, normative ideals of privacy and
private choice in everyday life subsisted in common understandings
of the proper means and ends of constitutional law, including the
protection of houses, intimacy, conscience, business, and personal
communications, and through limits on state intrusion, surveillance,

8

9

10

11

12

U.S. CONST. amend. III; see also Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The
Third Amendment was designed to assure a fundamental right to privacy.”); Robert A.
Gross, Public and Private in the Third Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 215, 221 (1991) (noting that the Third Amendment provides a “foundation for a right of privacy guaranteed
by the Constitution”).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. But see Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L.
REV. 1511, 1515 (2010) (suggesting that the Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation
of privacy test should be abandoned).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (conceding
that the Fourth Amendment “protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion”).
U.S. CONST. amend. V. Cf. Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 414 n.12 (1966) (noting
that the Fifth Amendment reflects “our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and the right of each individuals ‘to a private enclave where he may lead a private
life’”).
U.S. CONST. amend. IX; cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (striking
down laws criminalizing the use of contraception by married couples); id. at 490, 493
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (“[T]he Framers did not intend that the first eight amendments be construed to exhaust the basic and fundamental rights . . . . And, the Ninth
Amendment, in indicating that not all such liberties are specifically mentioned in the first
eight amendments, is surely relevant in showing the existence of other fundamental personal rights, now protected from state, as well as federal, infringement.”).
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13

and interference with individual and collective liberty.
Though
14
15
16
conceptions of privacy—associational, informational, physical, de17
18
19
cisional, proprietary, and intellectual conceptions—played, as it
were, “behind-the-scenes” and “supporting actor” roles in the theory
and practice of American constitutionalism at the beginning, they
20
came to play “starring” roles in the centuries ahead. The Bill of
21
Rights was fully ratified in 1791. By the time the bicentennial of the
13
14
15

16

17
18
19

20

21

See Allen, supra note 6, at 147 (citing evidence from the Federalist Papers of relevant public-private distinctions embedded in the Founders’ and Framers’ constitutional thinking).
By “associational privacy,” I mean freedom to form and maintain exclusive social and political groups.
By “informational privacy,” I mean limited access to personal or sensitive data, confidentiality and anonymity. I will sometimes include the federal courts’ First Amendment
“anonymity” jurisprudence in what I refer to here as “informational privacy” jurisprudence. Anonymity is an aspect of informational privacy in the straightforward sense of
limited access to information about persons (namely, information concerning their identities) or control over information about persons (again, information concerning their
identities). Anonymity jurisprudence is also included in what has been referred to as the
“intellectual” privacy, since anonymity is one of the means by which individuals enjoy
their intellectual privacy to, for example, express, and explore unpopular ideas. See infra
note 19.
By “physical privacy,” I mean limited spatial and sensory accessibility to others, such as
when one is secluded alone at home behind closed doors and when one is free from nonconsensual touching.
By “decisional privacy,” I mean non-interference with certain intimate choices such as
birth control, abortion, marriage, medical care, and consensual adult sexual partners.
By “proprietary privacy,” I mean ownership and control of the use of attributes of personal identity, such as voice, name, and photographic likeness.
By “intellectual privacy,” I mean the freedom to think about, read about and discuss
ideas. See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 389 (2008) (“Intellectual privacy is the ability, whether protected by law or social circumstances, to develop
ideas and beliefs away from the unwanted gaze or interference of others. Surveillance or
interference can warp the integrity of our freedom of thought and can skew the way we
think, with clear repercussions for the content of our subsequent speech or writing. The
ability to freely make up our minds and to develop new ideas thus depends upon a substantial measure of intellectual privacy. In this way, intellectual privacy is a cornerstone of
meaningful First Amendment liberties.”).
Constitutional uses of “privacy” have expanded to include those identified supra in notes
14–19. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001) (protecting the physical
privacy of a home occupied by drug dealers); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977)
(establishing informational privacy of confidential prescription data reported to states);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (protecting decisional privacy of woman’s abortion
choices); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (finding intellectual privacy of
pornography possession in a man’s home); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359
(1967) (protecting informational privacy of man using a phone in a public booth);
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (establishing associational
privacy and informational privacy of civil rights group). See generally ANITA L. ALLEN,
PRIVACY LAW AND SOCIETY 4–7 (2d Ed. 2011) (discussing legal definitions of privacy).
See Bill of Rights (1791), OUR DOCUMENTS (Jan. 1, 2012, 12:24 AM),
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=13 (providing background information on the Bill of Rights, which went into effect on December 15, 1791).
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22

Bill of Rights was being celebrated in 1991, the Supreme Court had
repeatedly and expressly held in landmark cases that the first ten
amendments and the Fourteenth Amendment protect privacy inter23
ests relating to a host of core concerns.
The terms “privacy,” “right to privacy,” and “expectations of privacy” featured prominently in landmark U.S. Supreme Court cases,
24
25
starting with Katz v. United States and Griswold v. Connecticut. These
cases and those for which they became precedents tested the notion
26
that government must be tolerant and constrained. Many scholars
now agree that human beings have dignity, autonomy, and needs by
27
virtue of which they merit lives and relationships of their own.
When it comes to homes, conversations, social groups, political affiliations, medical care, sexuality, marriage, and families, people should
be largely let alone. Even in areas of constitutional law where privacy
protection is not and cannot be the core concern, one finds federal
22

23

24

25
26
27

Cf. Warren E. Burger, Bicentennial Considerations on America’s Bill of Rights, 22 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 663, 664–65 (1992) (providing an essay based on former Chief Justice Burger’s
keynote address when he chaired the Commission on the Bicentennial of the United
States Constitution).
See supra note 20; see also Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecology,
476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (reaffirming Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and holding that
the right to privacy compels striking down state laws impeding ready, affordable, and
anonymous access to medical abortions), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) (O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.). Cf. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo.
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278–79 (1990) (holding that individuals have a strong liberty interest in private, autonomous medical decisionmaking). But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195–96 (1986) (holding that the fundamental right to privacy does
not extend to homosexual sodomy), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578
(2003).
389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (overturning a criminal conviction based on the warrantless interception of a phone call). The word “privacy” appeared in an exalted role in the early
wiretapping case, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471, 473 (1928), in a famous dissent by Justice Louis Brandeis. See infra note 41.
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down state laws criminalizing the prescription and use of
contraception).
The precedents include, of course, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See generally ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE (2011) (arguing
for ethical and legal duties to protect physical and informational privacies threatened by
contemporary practices of exposure and self-revelation); HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN
CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2009) (outlining
conception of privacy as contextual integrity to be applied to contemporary information
privacy problems); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN
PRIVACY AND SECURITY (2011) (arguing that greater national and local security does not
require abrogation of strong privacy protection); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING
PRIVACY (2008) (arguing that public policy and law should reflect an understanding that
there are a number of different varieties of privacy each with its own requirements and
justifications);
Judith
DeCew,
Privacy,
STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/privacy/ (last updated Sept. 18, 2006) (making a
strong normative case for physical and informational privacies).
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judges marking out a terrain of legally protectable privacy-related interests. U.S. approaches to criminal punishment are premised on
28
Yet Eighth Amendment juricoercive isolation and surveillance.
sprudence incorporates ideals of privacy as legal constraints on peno29
logical practices. The Second Amendment would appear to have lit30
But the jurisprudence of the Second
tle to do with privacy.
Amendment has come to incorporate ideals of the places we live as
protective sanctums wherein privileges of self-defense and ownership
are inconsistent with gun control laws that rule out the private decision to possess readily operable handguns in private homes. For example, the Court recently struck down a local Washington D.C. law
prohibiting possession of unlicensed firearm possession, including in
private homes, on the grounds that the Second Amendment confers
on individuals an individual right to protect themselves and their
31
families.

28

29

30
31

See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (holding that a prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his prison cell); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 559–60
(1979) (holding that Fourth Amendment and Eighth Amendment-based privacy claims
fail in light of legitimate goals and methods of criminal detention). Cf. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 225 (2005) (holding that prisoners’ liberty interests and prisons’ needs
and objectives must be balanced).
The Eighth Amendment provides that “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
The ban on cruel and unusual punishment bears on how extensively prisons can withhold
from inmates desired conditions of solitude, modesty, private communication, and confidentiality. See Merriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 418 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[A] prisoner’s
expectation of privacy is extremely limited in light of the overriding need to maintain institutional order and security . . . . The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment stands as a protection from bodily searches which are maliciously motivated, [and] unrelated to institutional security . . . .” (citations omitted)); see also
Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 152 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J., conurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that cultural nudity taboo warrants respect for prisoners modesty
and privacy).
It reads: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635–36 (2008) (“[W]e hold that the District’s
ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense. . . . [T]he enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes
certain policy choices off the table. These include the absolute prohibition of handguns
held and used for self-defense in the home. Undoubtedly some think that the Second
Amendment is outmoded in a society where our standing army is the pride of our Nation,
where well-trained police forces provide personal security, and where gun violence is a serious problem. That is perhaps debatable, but what is not debatable is that it is not the
role of this Court to pronounce the Second Amendment extinct.” (emphasis added)). In
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (Alito, J.), the Supreme Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment right to bear arms
as articulated in Heller fully applicable to the States.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
Notwithstanding its nontextual, implicit, judge-made origins, constitutional privacy law has served as an important instrument of social
change. Indeed, the adoption by the Supreme Court of doctrinal
discourses of privacy has helped to bring about significant changes in
key societal sectors. A notable instance in the health-care arena, the
32
Supreme Court’s decision in Cruzan v. Missouri, led to routine ex33
ecution of “living wills” and “advanced directives.” Nancy Cruzan
34
was an adult state hospital patient in a persistent vegetative coma.
Unable to eat and drink on her own, she received food and water for
35
many years through tubes inserted into her body to keep her alive.
Missouri state hospital authorities refused a request by Cruzan’s parents to cease artificial nutrition and hydration of their daughter who
36
had no hope of recovery. The Supreme Court of Missouri recognized a right to refuse treatment, grounded in the doctrine of informed consent, but refused to authorize Cruzan's parents to choose
death over life on her behalf in the absence of clear and convincing
37
evidence of her own wishes. The Supreme Court emphasized that
medical decision making should be in the hands of private individuals, not the state; but upheld the state of Missouri’s “clear and con38
vincing evidence” standard as protective of individual liberty. The
Cruzan decision was interpreted to mean that the Fourteenth
Amendment privacy interest of autonomous individuals in making
their own life and death medical decisions could be protected by documenting their wishes in advance of coma or other cognitive inca-

32

33

34
35
36
37

38

497 U.S. 261 (1990). Widely discussed as a privacy case, the role of privacy is muted in
the opinion that speaks of private individuals’ “liberty interest” in medical decisionmaking rather than a fundamental right to privacy. See id. at 278 (“The principle that a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.”).
Cf. Robert N. Swidler, Take Your Own Advice—Please: Advance Planning for Healthcare Decisions, 83 N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 20, 21 (Jul./Aug. 2011) (“When living wills first appeared in the
1960s, the legality of the documents was uncertain, and the people who completed them
were considered a bit idiosyncratic. To be sure, our culture has changed dramatically
since then, and such documents are now familiar and legally accepted.”).
Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261, 266–267.
Id. at 266 (“[S]urgeons implanted a gastrostomy feeding and hydration tube in Cruzan
with the consent of her then husband”).
Id. at 267.
See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W. 2d 408, 425 (Mo. 1988) (“[N]o person can assume that
choice for an incompetent in the absence of the formalities required under Missouri's
Living Will statutes or the clear and convincing, inherently reliable evidence absent
here.”).
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
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39

pacity. Following the Cruzan decision, patients and the elderly have
been encouraged not only to discuss their end of life wishes with family and friends but also to execute “living wills” or other advance directives stating the types of medical interventions they would wish in
40
the event of incapacity.
The Court’s constitutional privacy law has facilitated even more
sweeping and dramatic movement in new directions than that
represented by the advance medical directive. For example, the de41
velopment of the “reasonable expectations of privacy” analysis in
42
Fourth Amendment cases following Katz v. United States recalibrated
the balance of power between citizens and law enforcement for a
generation. Dissenting in an early wiretapping case, Justice Brandeis
43
had urged such a recalibration. In Olmstead v. United States, the ma39

40

41

42

43



Since the 1980s the question of whether patient “autonomy” should alone dictate end of
life option has become a matter of intense policy debate. Compare Robert H. Blank, Endof-Life Decision Making Across Cultures 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 201, 201–02 (2011) (contrasting the importance that Western medicine places on patient autonomy with other world
cultures that do not share such an emphasis), with Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider,
Enough: The Failure of the Living Will, 34 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 30, 30–31 (2004) (arguing
that it is against public policy to allow an individual to bind his or her future self through
living wills).
Patsy K. Keyser, After Cruzan: The “Values Base” to Advance Directives, 11 ORTHOPAEDIC
NURS. 37, 37–40 (1992) (noting that, in light of Cruzan, decisions surrounding lifesustaining treatment refocused on advance directives, such as living will and durable
power of attorney for health care decisions and additional "clear and convincing" evidence of the patient's wishes, may be beneficial); see also James F. Childress, Dying Patients:
Who’s in Control?, 17 J. L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 227, 228 (1989) (noting that meaningful
autonomy remains elusive despite advance directives developed in response to legal requirements of informed consent applied to incompetent and comatose patients kept alive
by new health care technologies).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361–62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ . . . reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical invasion.”).
Id. at 359 (“Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. The government agents here ignored ‘the procedure of antecedent justification . . . that is central to the Fourth Amendment,’ a procedure that we hold to be a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in this case. Because the surveillance here failed to meet that condition,
and because it led to the petitioner’s conviction, the judgment must be reversed.” (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)).
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“We
have likewise held that general limitations on the powers of Government, like those embodied in the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, do not forbid the United States or the states from meeting modern conditions by regulations which
a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary
and oppressive. . . . The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions fa-
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jority on the Court agreed with the government that wiretapping accomplished without entering a private home or office did not require
44
a search warrant. Concerned about the implication of technology
for the privacy of new and old modes of communication, a forwardlooking Brandeis urged his brethren on the Court to understand pri45
vacy as an imperative of enlightened civilization. The jurisprudence
46
spawned by Katz has had its critics, especially in light of problems associated with government use of and access to recent surveillance and
47
communication technologies. Yet, after the Katz decision, it was impossible to design a law enforcement or surveillance practice without
attention to whether privacy interests required a search warrant,
court order, or procedural showing. Privacy jurisprudence is not
necessarily pro-privacy; and some would argue that current Fourth
Amendment interpretations reveal a lawmaking designed less to
shield individuals than to make “dark corners” of the modern capital48
ist administrative state visible to the maximally tolerable degree.
Judicial interpretations of search and seizure law after the tragic
events of September 11, 2001, have upheld privacy diminishing legislation relating to law enforcement and intelligence gathering, such as

44
45
46

47

48

vorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual
nature, of his feelings, and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of
rights, and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Id. at 466 (“[T]he wire tapping here disclosed did not amount to a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
Id. at 478.
Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511 (2010) (arguing that
the reasonable expectation of privacy test should be abandoned); Daniel J. Solove, Digital
Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083 (2002).
See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503 (2007)
(criticizing the Supreme Court for failing to provide a consistent explanation for what
makes an expectation of privacy “reasonable”); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945 (2012) (denying petitioner’s motion for a rehearing on the issue of whether evidence
of illegal drug trade can be used to convict where police and the FBI secretly attached a
GPS device to suspected drug dealer Antoine Jones’ car without a search warrant and
monitored the car’s movement for twenty-eight days).
Ken I. Kersch, The Reconstruction of Constitutional Privacy Rights and the New American State,
16 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 61, 61 (2002).
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50

the “roving” surveillance warrants and agency data-sharing autho51
rized by the PATRIOT Act.
Consider, too, by way of example, the infamous penumbral priva52
cy doctrine set forth in Griswold v. Connecticut. It was transformative
53
and it changed American women’s lives forever. Prior to Griswold,
the prescription, sale, and use of birth control was restricted by law in
54
Connecticut and several other states. The innovative privacy doctrine embraced by the Court’s majority, according to which a right to
privacy is entailed by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments, cleared the way for American women to use medical
55
contraception, including “the pill.” In Griswold, the Supreme Court

49

50

51

52
53

54

55



Uniting and Strengthening America Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, § 206, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (as
amended).
Cf. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Int. Sur. Ct. Rev. 2002) (holding that the
PATRIOT Act allows government agencies to share information received through surveillance of agents of foreign powers).
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (amending numerous federal law enforcement,
financial, and communications laws).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Of course, the majority opinion of Justice Douglas in Griswold also transformed constitutional jurisprudence itself. Cf. Risa Goluboff, Dispatch from the Supreme Court Archives: Vagrancy, Abortion, and What the Links Between Them Reveal About the History of Fundamental
Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1365–66 (2010) (highlighting where Ninth Amendment
rights are concerned, strict scrutiny applies).
For example, Massachusetts law criminalized birth control. Indeed, even today, that
state’s largely ignored archaic law only approves administering or prescribing birth control to “married” persons. See Washington Legislature Debates Archaic Law Banning Birth
Control For Unmarried Women, WASH. INDEP., Oct. 5, 2011,
http://washingtonindependent.com/113063/massachusetts-legislature-debates-archaiclaw-banning-birth-control-for-unmarried-women, a seeming limitation invalidated by the
Supreme Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272 § 21A (1966) (“A registered physician may administer to or prescribe for any married person drugs or articles
intended for the prevention of pregnancy or conception. A registered pharmacist actually engaged in the business of pharmacy may furnish such drugs or articles to any married
person presenting a prescription from a registered physician.”). See also Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding constitutional any statute whereby single persons
may not obtain contraceptives from anyone to prevent pregnancy). See generally Mary L.
Dudziak, Just Say No: Birth Control in the Connecticut Supreme Court before Griswold v Connecticut, 75 IOWA L. REV. 915, 918–20 (1990) (describing federal and state restrictions on
birth control prior to Griswold, and noting that Connecticut and Massachusetts “lagged
behind” most other states due to influence of Catholic Church); see also C. Thomas Dienes, The Progeny of Comstockery—Birth Control Laws Return to Court, 21 AM. U. L. REV. 1
(1972) (detailing a history and analysis of Massachusetts and other states’ moralistic laws
restricting access to birth control).
See generally NANCY GIBBS, LOVE, SEX, FREEDOM AND THE PARADOX OF THE PILL: A BRIEF
HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL (2010) (noting Griswold ruled that the Bill of Rights implicitly included a right of privacy and overturned bans on contraception by married couples);

896

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 14:4

struck down Connecticut’s law criminalizing married couples’ use of
medically prescribed contraception, relying on a newly identified
“right to privacy” grounded in what it termed the “penumbra” of the
56
Bill of Rights. The new jurisprudence of privacy unleashed an independent brand of American woman greatly in control of her repro57
ductive capacities, for whom fears about pregnancy no longer
needed to govern decisions about sex, marriage, education, and employment. Griswold launched “sexual” and “cultural” revolutions,
58
continued by two later cases, Eisenstadt v. Baird, which extended the
59
holding of Griswold to unmarried men and women, and Roe v. Wade,
60
which decriminalized medical abortions.
Roe v. Wade and more than two dozen subsequent abortion cases,
embodied a jurisprudence of constitutional privacy for which Griswold
was a crucial precedent, but premised on a more straightforward
61
Fourteenth Amendment privacy doctrine. For a time a majority on
the Court embraced Roe’s doctrine that a “fundamental” right to privacy is entailed by the individual liberty and due process guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Roe the strict scrutiny required by
62
a fundamental right was applied to criminal abortion statutes. Such
statutes categorically criminalizing most abortions were held to be
unconstitutional. Case law relying on this idea of a fundamental right

56
57

58
59
60

61

62

ELAINE TYLER MAY, AMERICA AND THE PILL: A HISTORY OF PROMISE, PERIL, AND
LIBERATION 118–19 (2011) (articulating the Griswold holding and its impact on women).
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
But see CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
100–102 (1987) (arguing that privacy rights help preserve male control over the private
sphere unless women are freed from coercive relationships and subordination).
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id.; see also DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE
MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (rev. ed. 1998) (noting that the quest for decriminalizing medical
abortions came from Roe v. Wade).
The Supreme Court applied a “compelling interest” standard in cases scrutinizing the
regulation of abortion, beginning with Roe v. Wade. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155; id. at 170 (Stewart, J., concurring). Under this highest of standard of review, a governmental regulation that interferes with the decision to abort is presumed invalid; to overcome the presumption, the government must show that its regulation constraining personal choice is
narrowly drawn to further a legitimate and compelling state interest. Id. at 165. The
Court no longer applies the compelling state interest requirement of Roe in all abortion
cases. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the Court required only that
the government establish that challenged abortion restrictions did not impose unduly
burdensome interference on the important constitutional right to choose. Casey, 505
U.S. at 874–77.
Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
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63

to abortion privacy had a profound effect on women’s health. It led
to fewer deaths from illegal and non-medical abortions, and in64
creased availability and usage of affordable medical abortions. It
spawned moderate state laws regulating but permitting most first and
second trimester abortions. It helped to shape the manner in which
women’s reproductive health services would be delivered—namely, in
specialized, segregated clinics. Roe v. Wade effected another social
change that pleases no one: the polarization of national politics and
the creation of a pro-life/pro-choice “litmus test” of political viabili65
ty.
Constitutional privacy doctrines played a role in Loving v. Virgin66
ia, the Supreme Court decision striking down state interracial marriage bans. The end of these bans has brought demographic and
other social changes. Such bans were among the last strongholds of
state-imposed segregation and ideologies of white supremacy. Loving
maintained that the privacy of spousal choice is both a matter of
equal protection and substantive liberty. After Loving, different-race
couples no longer faced criminal penalties; the number of marriages
63

64

65

66

See LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 1867–1973 1–6 (1997) (“The stunning transformation in law and public
policy regarding abortion and women’s rights was rooted in the declining conditions of
abortion under the criminal law and built on generations of women demanding abortions—and getting them.”).
It is widely recognized that the legalization of abortion decreased illegal abortion-related
mortality and morbidity. See Willard Cates, Jr., David A. Grimes & Kenneth F. Schulz, The
Public Health Impact of Legal Abortion: 30 Years Later, Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive
Health, 35 GUTTMACHER INST. 1 (2003), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/
pubs/journals/3502503.html.
See KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984) (describing
how abortion was thought to have been treated as murder, both popularly and legally);
EILEEN L. MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT
(1996); Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of a WomanProtective Abortion, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 1030–31 (2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=958254 (providing an example of
a South Dakotan abortion statute that captured national political attention due to its restrictiveness); Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and The Spread of
Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L. J. 1641, 1669 (2008) (“WPAA [woman
protective antiabortion argument] took shape in political relationships in which the abortion-hurts-women argument had important strategic functions.”); see also Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before Roe v. Wade, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. (June 2, 2010),
http://www. brennancenter.org/blog/archives/Greenhouse_and_Reva_B._Siegel (stressing that abortion rights symbolized “the new morality—a problematic ‘permissiveness’
that afflicted the nation”).
388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967); see also Loving Decision: 40 Years of Legal Interracial Unions, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO
(June
11,
2007),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyId=10889047 (chronicling the Loving couple and state of interracial marriage after
the landmark decision). But see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding
ban on polygamy).

898

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 14:4

between African Americans and whites has significantly increased,
67
along with the population of mixed race American families.
A mixture of equality and liberty-based constitutional privacy doctrines would reemerge in Lawrence v. Texas, the historic decision overturning Bowers v. Texas and establishing that consenting adults are entitled to make their own decisions about the sex of their intimate
68
partners. Both Loving and Lawrence would have a role in the gradual
case for gay partnership equality and gay marriage fought in the
states, and already won in more than half a dozen states, including
69
New York. While the path is less direct, constitutional understandings of privacy articulated in Lawrence played a role in undermining
the compromise implicit in the well-intended but misguided “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell” policy introduced during the presidency of Bill Clinton. Under the law, gays and lesbians could serve in the military if
70
they kept their sexual orientations a strict secret. The policy compromised the integrity and well-being of thousands of gay and lesbian
service members, their families, friends, and allies. The rule was abolished in September 2011, following a careful, step-wise congres71
sional and military review overseen by President Barack Obama.

67

68

69

70
71

Zhenchao Qian and Daniel T. Lichter, Changing Patterns of Interracial Marriage in a Multiracial Society, 73 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 1065, 1065–84 (2011) (stating that the number of
marriages between blacks and whites is increasing—for example, in 1980, only 5% of
black men married white women; in 2008 the number rose to 14%). Cf. RALPH RICHARD
BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE?: HOW THE AFRICAN AMERICAN MARRIAGE
DECLINE AFFECTS EVERYONE 37 (2011) (noting that in 2000 more than ten times as many
African American men intermarried as in 1960); Meredith Melnick, Study: Blacks and
Whites Intermarrying More in the U.S., TIME (Sept. 19, 2011), http://healthland.time.com/
2011/09/19/study-blacks-and-whites-are-marrying-more-in-the-u-s/#ixzz1aF0hZOgB (noting that the rate of interracial marriages between blacks and whites increased rapidly between 1980 and 2008, outpacing marriages between whites and other ethnic groups).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) overturning Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) (articulating that the liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual
people the right to choose to enter upon relationships in the confines of their homes and
their own private lives and still retain their dignity and freedom).
New York’s Marriage Equality Act went into effect June 24, 2011. See Marriage Equality
Act, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a et seq. (McKinney 2011); see also Same-Sex Marriage, Civil
Unions,
and
Domestic
Partnerships,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
28,
2012,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/s/same_sex_marriage/i
ndex.html (detailing the recent gay marriage legislation and litigation in New York, Connecticut, Iowa, New Hampshire, Vermont, Washington, and Washington, D.C.).
10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994), repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub.L. 111–
321, § 2(f)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 3516.
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Away “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/us/politics/23military.html.
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IV. FIRST AMENDMENT PRIVACY
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
72
Government for a redress of grievances.” The Amendment restricts
government from interfering with religious freedom and free press,
of course. But it also restricts government from interfering with
rights of assembly and grievance. From these express freedoms, the
Supreme Court has abstracted what is often termed a right of free association, meaning a right to form and belong to groups with social,
political, or religious purposes, including groups that may be critical
73
of government. The Supreme Court has held that the freedom of
association includes, inter alia, the freedoms (1) to keep membership
74
and membership lists a secret, and (2) to exclude unwanted others
from membership or participation in one’s exclusive groups and
75
group activities. The Court has also abstracted a right of anonymous
76
speech from the First Amendment. Privacies, both physical and informational, are requirements of thoroughgoing freedom of association and anonymous free speech. Seclusion and concealment, along
with informational privacies such as confidentiality, secrecy, and anonymity have been used as specific modes of restricting access to
people and information.
72
73

74

75

76

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
For cases holding that the right to associate is protected under the First Amendment, see
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 466 (finding that compelled disclosure of petitioner’s membership lists was likely to constitute an effective restraint on its members’ freedom of association). But see Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Keri, 356 F.3d 197 (2d
Cir. 2004) (declining to hold that freedom of association or the right to engage in anonymous speech entails a right to conceal one’s appearance in a public demonstration).
See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (upholding the right of each
group to deny membership to homosexual participants under the First Amendment);
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
But see N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. New York City, 487 U.S. 1 (1988) (upholding the constitutionality of New York City’s Human Rights law forbidding discrimination based on race,
creed, sex, and other grounds by any “place of public accommodation, resort or amusement”); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (denying that each group’s First Amendment rights were violated when they were required to
extend membership to women); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)
(denying right of Jaycees, a large, non-selective civic organization, to exclude women
from membership and upholding application of Minnesota Human Rights Act).
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (invalidating an Ohio statute that prohibited the distribution of anonymous campaign literature).
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With the examples of the Supreme Court’s sex, marriage, and reproductive rights jurisprudence in mind, constitutional privacy law
might appear to be an instrument of progressively liberal social
change. Traditions of racial privilege, heterosexual domination, and
sexism have been weakened in the United States with the help of
judicial interpretations of the Constitution that require protection for
privacy interests and fundamental individual privacy rights. But,
viewed overall, constitutional privacy doctrines have not been entirely
and exclusively servants of liberal social change. The adoption of privacy-based doctrines has also been a challenge and impediment to
liberal change. This point is supported by a close look at the dynamics of privacy jurisprudence under the First Amendment. I consider
three contexts: race, sexual orientation, and gender.
A. Race and Social Change
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson shows the ideal of freedom of
association and related associational privacy put to liberal progressive
77
uses. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (“NAACP”) is a national, multi-racial civil rights membership
organization organized under the laws of New York more than a
78
hundred years ago. In the early twentieth century, the leaders and
members of the NAACP devised and executed strategies designed to
force an end to state-enforced, race-based discrimination against
African Americans. The NAACP was active in Alabama in the 1950s,
where segregation on the basis of race entailed unequal political and
economic opportunity for African Americans of every educational at79
tainment and character. The Alabama NAACP regional offices and
affiliates recruited members and solicited contributions. Among the
goals of the Alabama NAACP was to push for desegregation of Alabama’s universities and places of public accommodations, such as retail stores, municipal buses, and hotels.

77

78
79

Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); see also Anita L. Allen, Associational Privacy and the First
Amendment: NAACP v. Alabama, Privacy and Data Protection, 1 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1
(2011).
See NAACP, Our Mission, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/pages/our-mission (last visited
Feb. 19, 2012).
See Allen, supra note 77, at 4–6 (describing the NAACP’s efforts in Alabama from 1918 on
and the hostilities between the organization and the state throughout the 1950s).
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1. NAACP
The story begins in the 1950s. Alabama had enacted a state statute which required a foreign corporation to qualify before doing
business in the state by filing its corporate charter with the Secretary
of State and designating a place of business and an agent to receive
80
service of process. Seeking to expel the NAACP from the state for
its unwelcome civil rights activism, in 1956 the Alabama Attorney
General charged the NAACP with violating the foreign corporations
81
law. Indeed the NAACP technically had skirted the law, but only
82
because (as a non-commercial entity) it considered itself exempt. In
furtherance of its bid to expel, Alabama ordered the NAACP to pro83
duce its membership list and the names of its officers and directors.
The NAACP tendered the required registration papers and the
names of its principal officers and directors; but Alabama was not satisfied. Fearing for the safety, jobs, and businesses of its members,
84
the NAACP refused to produce membership lists. In appealing a
$100,000 civil contempt penalty Alabama imposed as a consequence
of the refusal to disclose the names of its membership, the NAACP
argued that compelled disclosure of the membership lists would “abridge the rights of its rank-and-file members to engage in lawful asso85
ciation in support of their common beliefs.”
The Supreme Court agreed: “Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses
86
dissident beliefs.” A lack of informational privacy could “induce
members to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from
joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown through
87
their associations and of the consequences of this exposure.” The
Court held that
80
81
82
83

84

85
86
87

Patterson, 357 U.S. at 452.
Id.
Id. (“The Association had never complied with the qualification statute, from which it
considered itself exempt.”).
Id. at 453. (“[T]he State moved for the production of a large number of the Association’s
records and papers, including bank statements, leases, deeds, and records containing the
names and addresses of all Alabama ‘members’ and ‘agents’ of the Association.”).
Id. at 462 (“Petitioner has made an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic
reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of
public hostility.”).
Id. at 460.
Id. at 462.
Id. at 463.
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immunity from state scrutiny of membership lists which the Association
claims on behalf of its members is here so related to the right of the
members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate
freely with others in so doing as to come within the protection of the
88
Fourteenth Amendment.

The court concluded that “Alabama has fallen short of showing a
controlling justification for the deterrent effect on the free enjoyment of the right to associate which disclosure of membership lists is
89
likely to have.”
The Supreme Court’s associational and informational privacybased decision in NAACP was instrumental in furthering the immediate goals of an important player in the civil rights movement. The
decision rendered more difficult future uses of similar strategies by
officials seeking to hijack civil rights to preserve traditions of segregation based on myths of white superiority and privilege. NAACP was
an important precedent available to other African Americans stymied
90
by threats, intimidation, and opportunistic applications of state law.
2. Nation of Islam
NAACP served as a controlling precedent for a far less well-known,
but significant lower court case brought on behalf of the Nation of
91
Islam, Wallace v. Brewer.
In this extraordinary case, Alabama segregationists and allied state
officials sought to use a peculiar state registration law to expel Nation
of Islam Black Muslims, not for desegregation efforts but for purchases of land intended to make segregated African Americans selfsufficient. Under a corporate pseudonym “Progressive Land Developers, Inc.” and with the help of two white Alabamans, the Nation of
Islam purchased land in Alabama on which they hoped to set up an

88
89
90

91

Id. at 466.
Id.
See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963) (“We need not, in order to find constitutional protection for the kind of cooperative, organizational activity disclosed by this
record . . . subsume such activity under a narrow, literal conception of freedom of speech,
petition or assembly. For there is no longer any doubt that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments protect certain forms of orderly group activity. . . . [including] the right ‘to
engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas.’” (citing Patterson, 357
U.S. at 460)).
315 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (declaring a law requiring Muslims to register in Alabama unconstitutional).
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agri-business enterprise designed to employ black workers and pro92
duce wholesome, affordable food for urban markets.
In November 1969, residents of St. Clair County, Alabama learned
that an entity known as Progressive Land Developers, Inc. (“PLD”)
had quietly purchased two farms in the county totaling more than
900 acres from two white businessmen, former state senator Ray
93
Wyatt and dentist Dr. Robert McClung. PLD was owned by African
American “Black Muslims” affiliated with Elijah Muhammad’s Chica94
go-based Nation of Islam. The Nation of Islam had previously purchased farmland near Dawson and Sasser, Georgia and set up a suc95
cessful farm, dairy, and cannery.
Muhammad reported that he
hoped to purchase farmland throughout the south, and that the objective of his group’s farming enterprises was “to produce beef, dairy
products and vegetables, providing jobs for black people and lower
96
prices on goods shipped to Muslim stores in big cities.”
Not wishing to have Black Muslims operating in northern Alabama, riled residents organized a “Stop the Muslims” campaign.
Their goal was to invalidate the contracts of sale to PLD and to thereby oust the Muslims. The “Stop the Muslims” campaign attracted the
97
support of law enforcement and drew some two thousand local resi-

92

93
94

95

96

97

Interestingly, Wallace omits any details about the rich factual context of the litigation,
which were widely reported in southern newspapers and nationally circulated magazines
of the day all over the United States. See, e.g., infra notes 94–107.
Wallace, 315 F. Supp. at 436.
Northern Alabamans Resent Muslim Move, SARASOTA JOURNAL, Dec. 9, 1969, at 12 (describing
the
plight
of
the
Progressive
Land
Developers),
available
at
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1798&dat=19691208&id=YPYeAAAAIBAJ&sjid=
-YwEAAAAIBAJ&pg=7183,2032374.
Don McKee, Black Muslims Buying Big Acreages, CORPUS CHRISTI TIMES (Texas), Nov. 20,
1969, at 3–E (describing a 1743 acre operation managed by a northern Muslim transplant
David Spencer and employing local non-Muslim blacks as labor), available at
http://www.newspaperarchive.com/SiteMap/FreePdfPreview.aspx?img=100524307.
Id.; see also Joseph M. Chapman, Black Muslims . . . Mercenary or Missionary?, THE DISPATCH,
(Lexington, N.C.), Dec. 8, 1969, at 8 (describing the plight of the Progressive Land Developers),
available
at
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1734&dat=
19691208&id=y3kcAAAAIBAJ&sjid=fFEEAAAAIBAJ&pg=6885,3100860.
Wallace, 315 F. Supp. at 453 n.42 (“After defendants Wyatt and Bishop discovered that
Progressive Land Developers, Incorporated (PLD), a Black Muslim corporation, had purchased land in St. Clair County, they met with defendant District Attorney Waid for the
purpose of ascertaining how the Black Muslims could be kept out of St. Clair County. Defendant Hodges, from the Attorney General’s office, a native of St. Clair County, was appointed to assist Waid in his investigation. Waid or Hodges informed defendants Wyatt
and Bishop of the criminal penalties and laws concerning acting as an agent for an unqualified foreign corporation and the muslim registration statute. Both Waid and Hodges
disapproved of the Black Muslims owning land in St. Clair County.” (footnote omitted)).
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dents to a public meeting in a Pell City high school gymnasium.
Opponents of the PLD purchases warned that Muslims “don’t respect
our flag and they support communist positions in many ways while
they regard Christianity as the enemy” and that the farms PLD had
purchased “can easily be used for storage of weapons and training in
99
guerrilla warfare.”
Wyatt and McClung realized a $20,000 profit on land they sold to
100
the Muslims. Wyatt attempted to persuade St. Clair whites that PLD
101
had benign intentions. Indeed, PLD did have demonstrably benign
intentions. The Muslims planned to use the land purchase to bring a
$2.5 million vertically integrated food business to Alabama, creating
102
jobs that would also “supply their ghetto stores and restaurants.”
Wyatt, who called himself a “strict segregationist, just like the Muslims,” sold the Muslims pickup trucks and helped them secure local
103
workers. Wyatt paid a price for economic dealings with blacks: His
cows were shot, twelve of his cars were splashed with acid, and his au104
to dealership burned.
Wyatt’s own brother, Wallace Wyatt, joined
forces against him, forming an organization called “Restore Integrity
105
to Development” to derail the Muslim venture. An ex-con and Ku
Klux Klan Grand Wizard, Robert Shelton entered the fray against an
106
undeterred Ray Wyatt, as did a Baptist preacher, Reverend James H.
98

99

100
101
102
103
104
105
106



See Cordell S. Thompson, Black Muslims Fight to Keep Alabama Farm, JET MAGAZINE, Jan. 1,
1970, at 16–22 (explaining the goals of Wyatt and his organization), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=JjkDAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA22&lpg=PA22&dq=st+clair+a
labama+elijah+muhammad+nation+of+Islam+and+ray+wyatt&source=bl&ots=MJgMgVr03&sig=jMbkpsBn6q7avKYL-8W44M61PD0&hl=en#v=onepage&q=st%20clair%20
alabama%20elijah%20muhammad%20nation%20of%20Islam%20and%20ray%20wyatt&
f=false.
Wallace, 315 F. Supp. at 436. See Northern Alabamans Resent Muslim Move, SARASOTA J., Dec.
9, 1969, at 12 (describing the conflict between Wyatt and the local white residents), available
at
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1798&dat=19691208&id=
YPYeAAAAIBAJ&sjid=-YwEAAAAIBAJ&pg=7183,2032374; see also William Jones, Muslims
Buy Farmland in South; Feud Stirred, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 8, 1969 (describing the Alabama land feud), available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/chicagotribune/
access/577668392.html?dids=577668392:577668392&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:AI&type=his
toric&date=Dec+08%2C+1969&author=&pub=Chicago+Tribune.
Thompson, supra note 98, at 17.
Chapman, supra note 96, at 8 (quoting Wyatt as saying “All they have in mind is farming
and employing local people to do the work at a reasonable rate”).
Northern Alabamans Resent Muslim Move, supra note 99, at 12.
Thompson, supra note 98.
Northern Alabamans Resent Muslim Move, supra note 99.
Id.
Id. (“Robert Shelton, the Ku Klux Klan imperial wizard, left a federal prison last month
just in time to get into the fray.”); Muslims Give up Farm, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 18, 1970,
at A9 (reporting that Klan spokesman Robert Shelton said Klan leased land adjacent Muslims’ land to observe them and Elijah Muhammed announced plan to move farm to
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107

Bishop. Dr. McClung also paid a price for working on behalf of the
Muslims. He lost most of his dental practice and was forced to resign
108
as president of the John Birch Society.
Like Ray Wyatt and Dr. McClung, the Muslims and their attorney
were targeted with harassment. John Henry Davis was arrested in
connection with writing a five-dollar check for the purchase of gaso109
line.
Jimmy Holmes, hired by Wyatt after working in the Muslim
110
plant in Georgia, was prosecuted on what appeared to be trumped
111
up charges of trespass and allowing his livestock to run at large.
112
Holmes was also prosecuted for violations of a curious state law
criminalizing remaining in Alabama for more than one day as an un113
An arrest warrant was
registered “communist, muslim or nazi.”

107

108
109

110
111

112
113



Greene County in Western Alabama due to rifle fire and cattle poisonings), available at
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1964&dat=19700318&id=mbwiAAAAIBAJ&sjid
=CrYFAAAAIBAJ&pg=1757,544361.
See Martin Waldron, Muslims Buying Land to Farm in Alabama, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Florida), Nov. 24, 1969, at 15–A (quoting Bishop as saying “I for one am willing to lay down
my life for the cause [of ousting the Muslims] if necessary”), available at
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=888&
dat=19691124&id=QUxSAAAAIBAJ&sjid=-XsDAAAAIBAJ&pg=6958,3241637.
Thompson, supra note 98, at 18.
Wallace v. Brewer, 315 F. Supp. 431, 437 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (“On December 4, 1969, plaintiff Davis was arrested on a warrant sworn to by defendant Bishop on a charge of violating
Code of Alabama, Title 10, § 21 (94). This charge developed when defendant Wyatt purchased a five-dollar check from a local service station where Davis had purchased gasoline
with the check.”).
See Chapman, supra note 96, at 8 (Holmes hired by Wyatt after working on Muslim farm);
see also Northern Alabamans Resent Muslim Move, supra note 99.
Cf. Wallace, 315 F. Supp. at 435 (“On January 28, 1970, from the bench, this Court further
enjoined these defendants from prosecuting plaintiff Holmes under a warrant (issued on
January 7, 1970) charging him with permitting livestock to run at large.”).
ALA. CODE, tit. 14, § 97(1)–(8) (1940), invalidated by Wallace, 315 F. Supp. at 443–46.
ALA. CODE, tit. 14, § 97(1)–(8), 97(4a) (1940), invalidated by Wallace, 315 F. Supp. at 443–
46 (“Registration of communists, nazis, muslims, officers of communist party and officers
and members of communist front organizations. 1. Each person remaining in this state
for as long as one day who is a communist, nazi or muslim or is knowingly a member of a
communist front organization, shall register with the department of public safety on or
before the fifth consecutive day that such person remains in this state, and at such intervals thereafter as may be directed by the department of public safety. 2. Such registration shall be under oath and shall set forth the name (including any assumed name used
or in use), address, business occupation, purpose of presence in the state of Alabama,
sources of income, place of birth, places of former residence, and features of identification, including fingerprints, of the registrant; organizations of which registrant is a member; names of persons known by registrant to be communists, nazis or muslims or members of any communist front organization as the case may be; and any other information
requested by the department of public safety which is relevant to the purposes of this section. 3. Each and every officer of the communist party and each and every officer of
communist front organizations, knowing said organizations to be communist front organizations, and each and every member of nazi or muslim organizations, knowing said or-
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sworn out for Orzell Billingsley, Jr., who had assisted with the real es114
Billingsley, a prominent African American attortate sale to PLD.
ney who had served as a lawyer for both Dr. Martin Luther King and
115
Rosa Parks during the Montgomery Bus Boycott, was charged with
being an agent of a foreign corporation (presumably PLD) not li116
censed to do business in the state. (Ray Wyatt and Dr. McClung al117
so faced these charges.) A civil suit was brought by Pine Forest Missionary Baptist Church against Holmes, Billingsley, and PLD, seeking
118
$500,000. Located near one of the farms, the church alleged trespass and interference with land use.

114

115
116

117
118

ganizations to be nazi or muslim organizations, shall register or cause to be registered
said party or organizations with the department of public safety, if said party or organizations have any members who reside, permanently or for a period of more than thirty days,
in the state of Alabama. Such registration shall be under oath and shall include the name
of the organization, the location of its principal office and of its offices and meeting places in the state of Alabama; the names, real and assumed, of its officers; the names, real
and assumed, of its members in the state of Alabama and of any person who has attended
its meetings in the state of Alabama; a financial statement reflecting receipts and disbursements and by whom and to whom paid; and any other information requested by the
department of public safety which is relevant to the purposes of this statute. Such registrations shall be made within thirty days after the effective date of this section, and thereafter at such intervals as are directed by the department of public safety. 4. Failure to
register as herein required, or the making of any registration which contains any false
statement or any omission, shall constitute a felony and shall be punishable by a fine of
not less than $1,000 or more than $10,000, or by imprisonment in the penitentiary for
not less than two or more than ten years, or by both. 5. The registration records shall be
open to inspection by all law enforcement officers of the United States, of this state or of
any other state or territory of the United States. Such records may also, in the discretion
of the department of public safety, be open for inspection by the general public.”).
Orzell Billingsley, Jr. (1924–2001) was a prominent civil rights lawyer and municipal
judge, one of the first African Americans to be admitted to the Alabama State Bar. He
represented ordinary and high profile African Americans including Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. and Rosa Parks. Billingsley is said to have taken “a strong interest in the economic development of black communities.” Billingsley, Orzel Jr. (1924–2002), BIRMINGHAM
PUB. LIBR., http://www.bplonline.org/resources/BlackBirmingham.aspx (last visited Jan.
23, 2012).
Id.
Wallace, 315 F. Supp at 453 (“Thereafter, defendant Bishop swore out a warrant against
plaintiff Billingsley, a Negro attorney, for acting as an agent for a foreign corporation not
authorized to do business in Alabama, Sections 21 (93)–(94), Title 10, Code of Alabama.
Billingsley allegedly violated the statute for engaging in one specific act: filing for record
the deed for land purchased in St. Clair County by PLD. Billingsley did not draft or execute the deed but only filed it for record.”).
Id. at 436.
Id. at 454 (“Defendants Palmer, Hare and Cash, as Trustees of the Pine Forest Missionary
Baptist Church, brought a civil action in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County for trespass
against the plaintiffs and others. The complaint seeks compensatory damages for the
trespass and punitive damages in the amount of $250,000.00 for aggravating the trespass
and $250,000.00 damages for denying and infringing upon the church’s use of its land.”).
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In response to these suits and arrests, five of the individuals targeted by the “Stop the Muslims” campaign filed an action in federal
court, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of themselves and all “(1) Negro citizens of Alabama and their attorneys and
(2) members, friends and associates of the Lost Found Nation of Is119
lam.”
The plaintiffs sought relief including relief “from conduct
harassing, threatening and interfering with plaintiffs in exercising
their first amendment rights to express themselves and associate and
to exercise their chosen religion, and their statutory rights to hold
120
and own property and to make contracts.” The defendants argued
that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief because “the Black Muslim organization is not a religion but a political organization whose
sole advocacy is violence and black racism and whose purpose in St.
Clair County is to establish, by means of force if necessary, a separate
121
nation of its own.” The Muslims were denied class action status but
successfully challenged the constitutionality of the Muslim registra122
tion law at the heart of efforts to intimidate them.
The Court found that the registration law was vague and over123
broad.
There was, for example, no definition of “muslim” in the
law, which required that “muslims,” “communists,” and “nazis” who
remained in Alabama for one day must register with the department
of public safety and supply a host of information about themselves
and their groups. Citing NAACP, the Court held that the registration
law was an unconstitutional abridgement of the First Amendment
right of freedom of association. The law violated notions of associa-

119

120
121

122

123

Id. at 435 (“Plaintiffs premise their request for declaratory and injunctive relief upon the
first, fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth, thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the
U.S. Constitution and also upon 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985 and 1988.”). The
court declined to certify a class consisting of all Negro Alabamans and their lawyers, but
the suit went forward on behalf of the individually named plaintiffs. Id. at 437–38.
Id. at 435.
Id. at 449–50 (“[Defendants argue that] Black Muslims are members of a foreign nation
or political organization, not a religion, which seeks to establish a foreign nation within
the United States, and in particular in St. Clair County. They further argue that Black
Muslims, as members of a foreign nation, are not citizens of the United States and thus
not entitled to first or fourteenth amendment rights or equitable relief; that a state government has inherent governmental authority to protect itself against insurrection and
overthrow by violence; and that the statutes attacked by plaintiffs are designed to protect
the State’s right to a republican form of government, guaranteed by Article 4, Section 4
of the United States Constitution.”).
Id. at 443 (“For the above reasons, we conclude that section 97(4a) is an unconstitutional
abridgment upon the first amendment right of freedom of association.”). The plaintiffs
sought to represent the “class of all ‘Negro citizens of Alabama and their attorneys.’” Id.
at 438.
Id. at 440.
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tional privacy by requiring individual “muslims” to identify themselves, and provide detailed personal information about themselves
124
The Court found that the “first amendment
and their associates.
reasoning of the Supreme Court in the production of membership
list cases [best exemplified by NAACP] is equally applicable where the
125
statute requires registration of individual members.”
The Court
cited and quoted NAACP, as well other free expression cases: “This
Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to asso126
ciate and privacy in one’s associations.”
3. Cork Club
It is not only groups seeking progressive advancement of African
Americans who have the First Amendment right of associational pri127
vacy. The right would belong equally to a group with the polar opposite goal of seeking to maintain the African American community
128
as a lowly, economically, socially, and politically inferior caste. Such
a group would have prima facie entitlement to keep its membership
secret from the state, no less than the NAACP or Nation of Islam.
The federal courts’ “truly private” club cases reveal limitations,
though, on private groups’ ability to use the First Amendment doctrine of associational privacy as a sword against efforts by African
Americans to break down traditional barriers to full citizenship with
the help of the nation’s civil rights statutes. Wright v. Cork Club was a
129
telling instance.

124
125
126
127

128

129

Id. at 442.
Id. at 443.
Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)).
See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002)
(applying the First Amendment right of associational privacy to the preaching activities of
Jehovah’s Witnesses); MacIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (applying the First Amendment right of associational privacy to the distribution of anonymous
leaflets opposing a proposed school tax levy); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960)
(applying the First Amendment right of associational privacy to the distribution of handbills in Los Angeles). But see John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (holding
that with respect to referendum petitions, the disclosure requirements were sufficiently
related to significant state interests so as to satisfy the scrutiny standard applicable to First
Amendment challenges).
Cf. Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 207–08 (2d Cir.
2004) (stating that hooded masks worn by KKK members did not constitute expressive
conduct entitled to First Amendment protection, and that New York’s anti-mask statute
prohibiting the wearing of masks or disguises in public, other than for entertainment
purposes, was not facially unconstitutional).
315 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
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In May 1967 a woman representing a social sorority contacted the
Cork Club of Houston, Texas about holding a luncheon and fashion
show on its premises. Ethel Banks spoke by telephone to Al Uhlen130
hoff, auditor of the Club. Uhlenhoff informed Banks that membership was not necessary for use of the Cork Club’s facilities and that
sorority members would be welcomed as guests of the club’s presi131
dent.
However, Uhlenhoff sent Banks application forms inviting
132
Mrs. Noah Wright, an African
sorority members to join the Club.
American, filled out an application and returned it with a dues check
for $18.00, payable to the Cork Club. She soon received a member133
ship card in the mail. Except for Mrs. Wright, no African American
134
had ever been issued a membership card by the Cork Club.
In June 1967 Wright twice visited the club for drinks, and from
the visits the Cork Club management learned that they had conferred
membership on a black person. That same month Uhlenhoff wrote
to Wright that
“the matter of integration has never come before the membership of the
Cork Club;” that the question of integration would be brought up at the
next stated meeting in January, 1968; and that her membership card
would not be active until the question was settled; Mr. Uhlenhoff also advised Mrs. Banks that the sorority’s plans for a luncheon and style show at
135
the Cork Club were cancelled.
136

Wright brought a lawsuit alleging violations of the Civil Rights Act.
She maintained that the Cork Club was private in name only and was
in fact a place of public accommodations subject to the provisions of
137
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The court stated as background for its decision that “governmental regulation of the membership of private clubs is beyond the pale
138
of governmental authority.” Indeed, “[i]f the government were allowed to regulate the membership of truly private clubs, private organizations, or private associations, then it could determine for each
citizen who would be his personal friends and what would be his pri139
vate associations, and the Bill of Rights would be for naught.” Yet
Wright prevailed. The Cork Club was found to be a place of “public
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id. at 1146.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (2006).
Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. at 1157.
Id.
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accommodation” with the shell of a “private club” status maintained
primarily for purposes of complying with Texas liquor control laws
140
limiting alcohol service to private clubs. The court found that, other than for race, the Cork Club did not carefully screen applications
for membership, did not limit the use of its facilities or services strict141
ly to members, and advertised its facilities to the general public.
The club had lax membership policies, and was open to white people
142
with little regard for their “good credit and good character.”
For
these reasons, the court concluded that the Cork Club did not qualify
for the private club exemption provided for in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e)
143
and required by constitutional ideals of free association.
B. Sexual Orientation and Social Change
Two well-known First Amendment cases blended expressive freedom of association doctrines and privacy concepts in service of heterosexual groups’ efforts to exclude homosexuals from organizations
and activities otherwise widely open to all. As it was used (unsuccessfully) in the Cork Club case, the First Amendment private association
doctrine was used (successfully) in the gay rights cases to sustain a status quo of majority group privilege.
1. Boston Parade
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Bos144
ton the Supreme Court considered whether consistent with the First
Amendment “Massachusetts may require private citizens who organize a parade to include among the marchers a group imparting a
145
message the organizers do not wish to convey.”
In the succinct
words of Justice Souter who wrote for the majority, such a mandate

140

141
142

143
144
145

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(2)–(3) (2006) (stating that all persons shall be entitled to equal
access at establishments “affecting interstate commerce or supported in their activities by
State action as places of public accommodation . . . . [including] any restaurant, cafeteria . . . or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on premises,
including but not limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment; or any gasoline station”).
Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. at 1154.
Id. But see Solomon v. Miami Woman’s Club, 359 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (holding that a woman’s club with whites-only admissions policy was not formed as a sham
simply to evade civil rights law).
Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. at 1156.
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
Id. at 559.
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146

violates the First Amendment. For two years running, in 1992 and
1993, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council had refused to
allow the gay pride group Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston (“GLIB”) march in an annual St. Patrick’s Day pa147
rade through the public streets of Boston. State officials and courts
had found that the exclusion of GLIB from the forty-seven-year-old
institution violated “the State and Federal Constitutions and of the
state public accommodations law, which prohibits ‘any distinction,
discrimination or restriction on account of . . . sexual orientation . . . relative to the admission of any person to, or treatment in
148
any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement.’”
The
state trial court found, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
agreed, that the parade fell within the statutory definition of a public
accommodation, which was defined as any place “which is open to
149
and accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public.”
The United States Supreme Court found, however, that parade
organizers could not be required to include GLIB, a gay, lesbian, and
150
bisexual pride group, in their parade.
GLIB’s participation could
be perceived as support for gay and lesbian equality, especially since
there was no traditional way for the organizers to disavow “any identity of viewpoint” between themselves and any group selected for par151
ticipation. In order to protect the expressive freedom of the parade
organizers, the Court, in effect, endorsed a physical segregation of
GLIB from the parade. The Court seemed to over-estimate the likelihood that admitting GLIB would have been forcing a message of
endorsement as opposed to mere toleration. Permitting the parade
organizers to segregate themselves from unwelcome gays and lesbians
might be compared to permitting Alabamans the segregated distance
they sought from Muslims whose viewpoints they reject. Ironically,
one of south Boston’s communities most associated with the St. Pa152
trick’s Day parade is now a hub of Boston’s gay community life.
146

147
148
149
150
151
152



Id. at 566 (“We granted certiorari to determine whether the requirement to admit a parade contingent expressing a message not of the private organizers’ own choosing violates
the First Amendment. We hold that it does and reverse.” (citation omitted)).
Id. at 561–62.
Id. at 561 (alteration in original) (quoting MASS. ANN. LAW ch. 272, § 98 (LexisNexis
1992)).
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561–63.
Id.
Id.
See Erica Corsano, How Gay Is Southie?, BOSTON PHOENIX (Oct. 19, 2009),
http://thephoenix.com/boston/life/91293-how-gay-is-southie (“Once unthinkable, Boston’s most notorious neighborhood now sports a welcoming face.”); see also Cara Bayles,
Gay Community Gains a Larger Voice in South Boston, BOSTON.COM (Mar. 18, 2011),
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2. Boy Scouts
153

The Boy Scouts of America is an iconic institution.
Millions of
boys and men join to partake of opportunities for friendship, mentoring, and personal growth. The Boy Scouts is, formally speaking, a
154
private, not-for-profit organization. James Dale was an Eagle Scout
whose adult membership in the Boy Scouts of America was revoked
155
when the organization learned that he was gay. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that state public accommodations laws prohibited
156
Boy Scouts of
excluding Dale on the basis of sexual orientation.
America v. Dale asked the United States Supreme Court to decide, as
Justice Rehnquist framed the question, whether “applying New Jersey’s public accommodations law [construed to require admission of
a gay man to membership] violate[d] the Boy Scouts’ First Amend157
ment right of expressive association.” The Court, in an opinion by
Justice Rehnquist, held that the decision of the state supreme court
158
must be reversed on First Amendment grounds. The majority reasoned that: “The forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group
infringes the group’s freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group’s ability to
159
advocate public or private viewpoints.”
Although this freedom of expressive association was not absolute
and can be overridden “‘by regulations adopted to serve compelling
state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be
achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational
160
freedoms,’” it was not overridden here. The Boy Scouts organization believed that homosexuality was inconsistent with the “morally
straight” values it sought to instill in youth and declined to endorse

153
154

155
156

157
158
159
160

http://www.boston.com/yourtown/news/south_boston/2011/03/bar_by_bar_southie_g
ets_more_g.html (demonstrating South Boston’s acceptance of the gay community).
See generally BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, http://www.scouting.org (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
See Unit Gifts and Tax Exempt Status, CAPITALSCOUTING.ORG, http://www.
capitalscouting.org/capital_docs/bsa_unit_policy_update_2006.pdf (stating that Boy
Scouts of America is a 501(c)3 charity but individual chapters are not). See generally The
Boy Scouts of America Annual Report, Continuing the Journey, BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA (2010),
available at http://www.scouting.org/About/AnnualReports.aspx.
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
Id. (holding that New Jersey’s public accommodations law requiring that the Boy Scouts
admit Dale, an avowed homosexual, violates the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of
expressive association).
Id. at 644.
Id. at 648.
Id.
Id. (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
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161

homosexual conduct as legitimate behavior.
As the presence of
GLIB in Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day parade would have interfered with
the parade organizers’ choice not to propound a particular point of
view (we endorse/tolerate homosexuality?), the presence of Dale as
an assistant scoutmaster would interfere with the Boy Scout’s choice
not to propound a point of view (we endorse/tolerate homosexuality?) contrary to its beliefs.
Private associations are entitled by the First Amendment to segregate themselves in exclusive physical domains, hold secrets, confidences, and embrace viewpoints and messages that may be offensive
to others. Government cannot tell us whom or what to like. First
Amendment associational privacy cases, like Fourteenth Amendment
decisional privacy cases, trade, for better and for worse, on the notion
that privacy “amounts to the state of the agent having control over
decisions concerning matters that draw their meaning and value from
162
the agent’s love, caring, or liking.”
C. Gender, Technology and Social Change
I will now consider the extent to which the First Amendment’s
privacy jurisprudence of anonymous Internet speech contributes to
progressively liberal social change in the area of gender relations. I
163
will consider, inter alia, the AutoAdmit case, an infamous example
of anonymous Internet speech, which demeaned female law students
with sex and sexuality-related insults, false statements, and privacy invasions.
Legal scholars now recognize “the offensive Internet” as a major
164
problem, worthy of ethical, market, and even legal reforms.
The
Internet has brought about social change, described by Saul Levmore
165
as “succeeding in remaking us as inhabitants of a small village.”
161

162
163

164
165

Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 650 (“The Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values embodied in the Scout Oath and Law, particularly with the values
represented by the terms ‘morally straight’ and ‘clean.’”).
See JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 91 (1992) (discussing the connection between the nature of intimacy and Inness’s account of privacy).
See Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 256–57 (D. Conn. 2008) (holding that a student was entitled to disclosure of an anonymous Internet poster’s identity if she could
make a concrete showing as to the elements of a prima facie case against the anonymous
speaker to outweigh First Amendment protection of anonymous speech). See generally Ellen Nakashima, Harsh Words Die Hard on the Web; Law Students Feel Lasting Effects of Anonymous Attacks, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/Article/2007/03/06/AR2007030602705.html.
Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum, Introduction, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: PRIVACY,
SPEECH, AND REPUTATION 1, 1–5 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010).
Id. at 1.
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Communication is easy, and information spreads quickly. We know
and are known by people like us, notwithstanding geographical distances. But, in the case of the Internet, the descriptive term “village”
does not denote a place of kinship and solidarity. To be sure, the Internet can be such a place. An online patient forum might turn
strangers with nothing in common but their gender and a breast can166
cer diagnosis into quasi-sisters. Yet viewed from the vantage points
of many online sites, the Internet “village” feels more like the vicious
pre-civil society imagined in Hobbes’s Leviathan, than the ambivalent
but peaceful community of hut dwellers imagined in Rousseau’s Dis167
course on the Origin of Inequality.
The current era—I call it the Era of Revelation—is characterized
by the wide availability of multiple modes of communication, easily
and frequently accessed, capable of disclosing breadths and depths of
personal, personally-identifiable and sensitive information to a universe of people rapidly. Many Internet users are fond of broadcasting what they think and feel, motivated by business and pleasure, and
because they care about friendship, kinship, health, education, politics, justice and culture. Many people think of the Internet as the
most attractive and appropriate place to go to share, vent, discover,
and be silly. Yet there is no absolute right to say what is true, whether
offline or online, when doing so would tortiously invade privacy in a
168
manner that is highly offensive to a reasonable person. Nor is there
any exemption of anonymous Internet speech from the law of defamation, infliction of emotional distress, interference with contract, or
169
other familiar torts.
166

167

168

169



See, e.g., usafmom, Breast Cancer Topic: My Sister—the Idiot!!, BREASTCANCER.ORG (Dec. 16,
2011, 1:34 A.M.), http://community.breastcancer.org/468 U.S. 609forum/8/topic/7796
14 (recording a colloquy among women with stage IV metastatic breast cancer begun by a
woman complaining about her biological sister’s lack of interest in her cancer, leading
another to reply: “But you have all your sisters here that care so much! So vent away and
we will laugh and cry with you!”).
See Anita L. Allen, Driven into Society: Philosophies of Surveillance Take to the Streets of New
York, 1 AMSTERDAM L.F. 35, 35–36, Aug. 2009, available at http://ojs.ubvu.vu.nl/468 U.S.
609alf/Article/view/92/157 (comparing Locke and Rousseau’s social contract origin
myths).
Public disclosure of true but private facts is a tort recognized by the Restatement of Torts
(Second) and many state courts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977)
(stating that the right of privacy is invaded by the “unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another,” the appropriation of the other’s name or likeness,” “unreasonable
publicity given to the other’s private life,” and “publicity that unreasonably places the
other in a false light before the public”); see also, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (stating that
each citizen has an “inalienable right” to pursue and obtain “privacy”).
See Matthew Mazzotta, Comment, Balancing Act: Finding Consensus on Standards for Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers, 51 B.C. L. REV. 833, 845 n.88 (2010) (citing cases that
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American Internet users may face civil liability, but we are essentially unmuzzled in practice. Some of us are often intentionally disrespectful and abusive. Some in the United States exploit the privacy
we call anonymity to say and do things through the Internet that they
would not otherwise dare to say or do. Online and offline anonymity
allows the dark sides of ourselves to vent and prey with reduced accountability. Recording in private diaries would be better for some of
the harsh discourse posted online, but publication on the Internet
would appear to be the preference of many. The pairing of privacyas-anonymity and freedom of speech contribute to what Brian Leiter
170
refers to as “cyber-cesspools.”
These are “those places in cyberspace—chat rooms, websites, blogs and often the comment sections
of blogs—that are devoted in whole or in part to demeaning, harass171
ing and humiliating individuals.”
Cyber cesspools not only cause
dignitarian, emotional, and reputational harms but they also surely
172
threaten what Robert George terms the “moral ecology” of society.
1. Boyer, Clementi, and Deputy Jane Doe
Martha Nussbaum warns of “objectification” and a “culture of cru173
Ann
elty” that infects online communications and harms women.
Bartow has raised special concerns about the impact of Internet cul174
ture on women’s emotional, dignitarian, and economic interests.
In addition to women, young gay men have also raised special concerns about bullying and victimization online. The murder of Amy
175
176
Boyer in 1999 and the suicide of Tyler Clementi in 2010 stand as

170
171
172

173

174

175

hold that requests to unmask anonymous Internet speakers require a balancing of defendants’ rights to speak anonymously against plaintiffs’ rights to seek redress for harmful
speech).
Brian Leiter, Cleaning Cyber-Cesspools: Google and Free Speech, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET:
PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTATION, supra note 164, at 155.
Id.
ROBERT P. GEORGE, THE CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES: LAW, RELIGION, AND MORALITY IN
CRISIS 94 (2001); ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC
MORALITY 43 (1993).
Martha C. Nussbaum, Objectification and Internet Misogyny, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET:
PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTATION, supra note 164, at 79–80, 83. See generally Ann Bartow,
A Portrait of the Internet as a Young Man, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1079 (2010) (noting the poor
treatment of women because of the “commoditized” sexual nature of the Internet).
Ann Bartow, Internet Defamation as Profit Center: The Monetization of Online Harassment, 32
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 383, 384–92 (2009) (noting the emotional harms that women experience because of the Internet and the available legal and economic remedies for harms
committed on the Internet).
See Remsberg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1005–06 (N.H. 2003) (describing how
the murderer of Amy Boyer used Docusearch to discover Boyer’s birthdate, social security
number, and employment information before killing her).
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sad symbols of the destructive potential of personal and commercial
free speech online.
Amy Boyer was murdered by a former high school classmate Liam
Youens, who obtained information about her work address, a dentist’s office, from an online firm, Docusearch, and then stalked and
177
assassinated her as she left her workplace. Youens stored guns and
ammunition in his bedroom and warned of violence against Amy and
178
her family.
In 2010 a talented young musician named Tyler Clementi was a freshman at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey.
He asked his roommate Dharun Ravi to let him have their room for
the night for a date. Ravi consented, but pulled a prank. He remotely activated the webcam on a computer in their dorm room, webcasting Clementi’s same-sex intimacies all over the Internet, and letting
everyone know about it on Twitter. When Clementi learned what
had been done to him, the distraught gay youth bid farewell to his
friends online and then committed suicide. On September 22, 2010,
the teenager apparently leapt to his death off of the George Washing179
ton Bridge. Ravi’s thoughtless advantage-taking was unethical, and
180
as moral (bad) luck would have it, it also had a devastating out176

177

178

179
180



See Lisa Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal Jump, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30,
2010, at A1 (“It started with a Twitter message on Sept. 19: ‘Roommate asked for the
room till midnight. I went into molly’s room and turned on my webcam. I saw him making out with a dude. Yay.’”).
See Patrick Meighan & Joseph G. Cote, Nashua Man Charged in Bludgeoning Murder; City
Man, 20, Held Without Bail over Body in Street, TELEGRAPH (Nashua, N.H.), June 1, 2011,
http://www.nashuatelegraph.com/news/921206-196/charges-in-bludgeoning.html (“In
October 1999, Amy Boyer, 20, was ambushed by a gunman outside the dentist’s office
where she worked as she got in her car. The killer, Liam Youens, who then committed
suicide, was a former high school classmate who stalked her online. The case was often
cited nationally in efforts to pass cyberstalking laws.”).
See Andrew Wolfe, School Pauses to Remember Stalking Victim: IF YOU GO; New Hampshire
Technical Institute Hoping Memorial for Boyer Will Raise Awareness, TELEGRAPH (Nashua,
N.H.), Apr. 29, 2009, at 1 (“Boyer was slain by a former Nashua High School classmate,
Liam Youens, 21, who had secretly stalked her for years and wrote of his obsessions in a
journal he published online, though his Web site remained tragically obscure until after
her murder and his suicide.”); see also Dental School to Honor Alum, Slain Nashua Woman,
TELEGRAPH (Nashua, N.H.), Apr. 28, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 27989183 (“A subsequent police investigation revealed that Liam Youens kept firearms and ammunition in
his bedroom, and maintained a website containing references to stalking and killing Amy,
as well as detailing plans to murder her entire family, according to news accounts.”). Cf.
Liam Youens, http://www.netcrimes.net/Amy%20Lynn%20Boyer_files/liamsite.htm (last
visited Jan. 21, 2012) (creative fiction purporting to be an actual reproduction of the site
that Liam Youens ran on the Internet, depicting his thoughts and actions).
See Foderaro, supra note 176.
Clementi’s act of suicide was beyond Ravi’s control, yet we judge the severity of Ravi’s
misconduct by reference to its unlucky fatal consequence. See THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL
QUESTIONS (1979) (cited as sources of the problematic concept of moral luck); see also
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come, compounding the sense of its wrongfulness. Although Ravi
was not charged for Clementi's suicide, he was prosecuted and, in
181
March 2012, convicted of bias intimidation and invasion of privacy.
Cass Sunstein has argued that something should be done to protect men and women “against negligence, cruelty, and unjustified
damage to their reputations—[and] also to ensure the proper func182
tioning of democracy itself.”
That said, to be held accountable,
some individuals arguably deserve to have their conduct exposed on
the Internet, even anonymously. Whether dead-beat dads, unfaithful
wives, bad dates, and stubborn ex-husbands should be exposed online
is an open question. A grossly negligent physician—who allegedly
hired a consultant to manipulate her Google rankings and fabricate
“five star” rave customer satisfaction reviews—caused the vegetative
coma and premature death of a young patient who went to her for a
minor cosmetic procedure; this physician arguably deserved to have
individuals identifying themselves only as her former patients describing online the poor quality of care they believe they, too, had re183
ceived.
The “cruelty, and unjustified damage to their reputations” Suns184
tein refers to is a genuine problem. No one knows the precise extent of the problem, but many examples of people who wrongfully
invade privacy and publish through the Internet have found their way

181

182
183

184

Moral Luck, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (FALL 2008 ED.), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/moral-luck. Cf. Ian Parker, The Story of a Suicide, NEW YORKER, Feb. 6, 2012, available at http://www.newyorker.com/
reporting/2012/02/06/120206fa_fact_parker.
Kate Zernike, Jury Finds Spying in Rutgers Dorm Was a Hate Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2012,
at A1. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:16–1 (West 2008) (criminalizing bias intimidation
based upon a person’s sexual orientation); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:14–9(c), 2C:51 (criminalizing invasion of privacy).
Cass R. Sunstein, Believing False Rumors, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH,
AND REPUTATION, supra note 164, at 106.
Cf. Complaint, Rajagopal v. Does, No. CL10–3014 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2010-10-22-Rajagopal's
%20Complaint.pdf (describing circumstances wherein a plastic surgeon on probation for
alleged gross negligence, stemming from a cosmetic procedure which left her patient
permanently comatose, was accused of having hired a consultant to boost her standing in
the community with manufactured patient views and a priority browser ranking on
Google). In Rajagopal, the doctor sought to unmask the identities of five persons who
submitted negative comments about her practice on maps.google.com in 2009. Id. at 2–
3. She accused them of defamation, tortious interference with her contracts with existing
patients, tortious interference with her potential contracts with future patients and conspiracy to injure in trade, business, and reputation. Id. at 3–5.
Sunstein, supra note 182, at 106.
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into the courts. In the recent case of Doe v. Luzerne County, a deputy
chief of a sheriff’s department used his office computer to post and
share video taken of a subordinate female Deputy Sheriff in states of
undress.
Deputy Chief Ryan Foy accompanied Deputy Sheriff Jane Doe and
another officer to the decontamination area of the local hospital
where they had been ordered to report for treatment of an infestation of biting fleas picked up while attempting to serve a bench war186
rant.
Foy admitted filming Sheriff Jane Doe’s ordeal of flea bites
and decontamination. However, he denied stating, as Foy alleged,
187
that he made his video “for training purposes.” The images, which
Foy posted on the web via his office computer and showed to other
officers, allegedly depicted Doe partly and fully unclothed, revealing
a tattoo drawn on her back. The tattoo was the initials of another
188
woman to whom Doe had a romantic attachment.
Sherriff Jane Doe filed a lawsuit for invasion of privacy in violation
189
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The district court
granted the defendants’ summary judgment motion on the grounds
190
that Doe had failed to state a valid constitutional claim. The Third
Circuit found that Doe had a reasonable expectation of privacy while
191
she was in the decontamination area of a hospital but sustained
summary judgment with respect to the Fourth Amendment claim on
185
186

187
188

189

190
191

660 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that a female deputy sheriff had a reasonable expectation of privacy while undergoing a decontamination procedure).
Initially Doe and the other affected officers were ordered to “a nearby Emergency Management Building (‘EMA’) [to] await construction of a temporary decontamination
shower.” Id. at 171–72. Foy began filming Doe there. Doe claimed she requested that
Foy stop filming her; but Foy denied that she made such a request. Id. at 172.
Id. at 172 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 177 n.6 (expressing doubt about the claim that Does’s sexual orientation was
revealed for the first time to anyone as a result of Foy’s video). The court stated:
In addition to the exposure of Doe’s body in the Decontamination Area, Doe also
asserts that Foy’s filming of the tattoo of someone’s initials on her back led to the
discovery of the private and intimate fact that she is in a lesbianic relationship. We
note that initials of a person generally are not indicative of a person’s gender.
Furthermore, such an assertion is belied by the record, which contains no evidence that, as a result of the September 27 events, anyone learned for the first
time that Doe had a girlfriend.
Id.
Id. at 171. She also alleged, unsuccessfully, a failure to train claim. See id. (reversing the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to the county on Doe’s constitutional right to
privacy claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and affirming the district court’s order
dismissing all other claims).
Id. at 174.
Id. at 177 (“We conclude that Doe had a reasonable expectation of privacy while in the
Decontamination Area, particularly while in the presence of members of the opposite
sex.”).
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the ground that the act of recording and sharing video of Officer
Doe was not a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
192
Amendment. Moreover, the court found that Deputy Chief Foy was
not acting in the scope of his official duties when he shot, viewed, or
193
posted the video on official department computers. The Third Circuit reversed the district court with respect to Jane Doe’s Fourteenth
194
Amendment invasion of privacy claim.
At least two kinds of privacy are protected by the Fourteenth
195
Amendment: decisional privacy, as in Roe v. Wade and Lawrence v.
196
197
Texas, and informational privacy, as in Whalen v. Roe. Jane Doe is
not straightforwardly arguing that a right of hers to be free from government interference with personal choices regarding intimate matters was infringed. Hence she did not appear to be relying on the reproductive rights or sexual privacy line of cases. Her case before the
Third Circuit was argued by a lawyer for the Electronic Privacy In198
formation Center, a clue that her Fourteenth Amendment claim,
despite its sexual overtones, is not based on a decisional privacy argument but rather on a bold informational privacy argument that has
199
begun to evolve in other jurisdictions.
192
193

194
195
196

197

198

199



Id. at 179.
Id. The court concluded:
Foy’s conduct of recording and disseminating the video and images of Doe was
not a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. At oral argument, Doe’s
counsel conceded that Foy filmed Doe for personal interest, and that Foy did not
film Doe in furtherance of any governmental investigation. Because Foy acted for
personal reasons and outside the scope of a governmental investigation, his actions do not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we will affirm the
District Court’s dismissal of Doe’s Fourth Amendment claim.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 179.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973) (finding a constitutional right to privacy,
which encompasses a woman’s qualified right to terminate her own pregnancy).
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) (holding that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a right to engage in consensual, homosexual relations without governmental interference).
See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (recognizing an individual’s interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal information, such as prescription drug usage, but upholding the
constitutionality of the New York statute at issue).
For an electronic version of this case, including the names of counsel, see Doe v. Luzerne
Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 171 (3d Cir. 2011), available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/
opinarch/103921p.pdf.
Id. at 176 (“Although the issue of whether one may have a constitutionally protected privacy interest in his or her partially clothed body is a matter of first impression in this circuit, other circuits—including the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits—have held that
such a right exists.” (citing Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 136–39 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding
that plaintiff, a female civilian who was participating in a police training video, alleged
sufficient facts to raise a triable issue of whether her constitutional right to privacy was violated where the male police officer surreptitiously filmed her in the dressing room while
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Whalen v. Roe concerned whether, consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment interest in informational privacy, the state of New York
could enact a law requiring pharmacists to report the names of pa200
tients receiving certain prescription drugs. Jane Doe’s claim could
be construed as a claim that state employees under color of office collected intimate, sensitive information and failed to protect it as required by the holding and dicta of Whalen. In this regard, nude photography and video precedent from other jurisdictions provided
201
critical support for Jane Doe’s argument.
2. Rotten Candy
The cases referred to in the last section reflect a low regard for
privacy and for the dignity of women and homosexuals of both genders. As we will see, in the online context, one set of privacy interests
clashes with another. The speakers’ informational privacy interests in
anonymous speech generally protected by the First Amendment,
clash with others’ informational and proprietary privacy interests pro202
tected by the common law. The common law and related state sta-

200

201

202



topless and without a bra)); Brannum v. Overton Cnty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 497–98
(6th Cir. 2008) (finding a privacy violation where a middle school’s surveillance cameras
recorded the plaintiff students in their undergarments while in the school locker room);
York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 454–56 (9th Cir. 1963) (finding that the plaintiff properly
stated a claim for a violation of her constitutional right to privacy where she alleged that,
while reporting a sexual assault, a male police officer deceived her into permitting him to
photograph her genitals and exposed breasts under the pretext of an investigation), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591 (“The constitutional question presented is whether the State
of New York may record, in a centralized computer file, the names and addresses of all
persons who have obtained, pursuant to a doctor’s prescription, certain drugs for which
there is both a lawful and an unlawful market.”).
The Third Circuit had not yet extended the Fourteenth Amendment privacy doctrine to
nudity cases. See Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d at 176 (“We have found the following types of information to be protected: a private employee’s medical information that was sought by
the government; medical, financial and behavioral information relevant to a police investigator; a public employee’s prescription record; a minor student’s pregnancy status; sexual orientation; and an inmate’s HIV-positive status.” (citing Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d
560, 565 (3d Cir. 2011) (dividing these types of privacy interests into three categories:
sexual information, medical information, and some financial information))).
The Second Restatement of Torts states the following:
652A. General Principle
(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the other.
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by:
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in 652B; or
(b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness, as stated in 652C; or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life, as stated in 652D; or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public,
as stated in 652E.
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203

tutes create civil liability for highly offensive publications of true but
private facts, for highly offensive publications that depict others in a
false light, and for appropriation of names, likenesses, and identities
for commercial purposes. If the tort law of privacy potentially
changes gender relations for the better by deterring and redressing
gratuitously offensive speech aimed at women, the constitutional law
of privacy, with its generous protection of demeaning, anonymous
speech targeting women, is a potential barrier to change. Indeed,
First Amendment privacy-as-anonymity jurisprudence potentially
functions as an instrument of social stasis in a world marked by traditions of gender subordination. The common law of defamation, infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy potentially functions as instruments of progressive social change.
Male Internet users exploit their power and online anonymity and
harm or offend women. But women can and do exploit privileges
and anonymity, for harmful, privacy-invading purposes, too. The
204
Yath case is illustrative.
Candace Yath was a patient at Fairview Clinics in Minnesota. She
revealed to her physicians at the clinic that she was having an extramarital affair. She was tested and treated for sexually transmitted in-

203
204

652B. Intrusion upon Seclusion
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
652C. Appropriation of Name or Likeness
One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.
652D. Publicity Given to Private Life
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of
a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
652E. Publicity Placing Person in False Light
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of
the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 652A–E (1997).
For the first and best known of such statutes, see, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51
(McKinney 2012).
See Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 37 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (describing a
dispute where a woman’s private sexual history was wrongly accessed and used to harm
and offend her online).
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205

fections. One of Candace’s husband’s relatives, Navy Tek, saw Can206
Tek
dace at the clinic and was curious about why she was there.
worked at the clinic as a medical assistant with access to electronic
records of patient health information. Tek decided to have a look at
207
Candace’s health record. When she learned about the STD and affair, two days later she e-mailed and then phoned Candace’s sister-inlaw, Net Phat, also a medical worker, and shared what she had
208
learned.
A short time later, Phat told her brother what she had
209
learned about his wife. He filed for a divorce. About the same time
a MySpace.com page appeared bearing a photograph of Candace, la210
beled “Rotten Candy.” The page stated that Candace Yath had had
a sexually transmitted disease, that she had cheated on her husband
211
and that she was addicted to plastic surgery. The MySpace page was
traced to a computer having an Internet protocol address assigned to
212
a business at which Navy Tek’s sister, Molyka Mao, worked.
Candace filed a lawsuit against Tek, Phat, Mao, and Fairview Clinics. She alleged that all defendants invaded her privacy, that all but
Mao had breached a confidentiality in violation of common law and
213
state statutes, and that all the defendants intentionally or negligently inflicted emotional distress. There were a number of issues in the
case, but the most important is whether information posted on MySpace for several days constituted “publicity” sufficient to meet the
prima facie case requirements of the “publication of private fact” in214
vasion of privacy tort.
In the many states that recognize the invasion of privacy tort, the requirement of “publication” generally re215
quires dissemination to more than one or two people. The appeals
court in Yath importantly concluded that the publicity requirement
205
206
207

208
209
210
211
212
213
214

215

Id. at 38.
Id.
Id. at 39 (“Fairview investigated and learned that Tek had accessed Yath’s medical file five
times between March 21 and May 4, 2006. Fairview determined that Tek had no legitimate business reason to do so and that, therefore, her access was unauthorized by Fairview policy and prohibited by HIPAA.”).
Id. at 38 (“Tek called and told Phat that she saw Yath’s record and that Yath had another
sex partner.”).
Id.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id.
There is no private right of action under the federal health privacy statute, HIPAA. Acara
v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 2006).
Yath, 767 N.W.2d at 44 (“We hold that the publicity element of an invasion-of-privacy
claim is satisfied when private information is posted on a publicly accessible Internet website.”).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977).
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had been met: “information was posted on a public MySpace.com
page for anyone to view. This Internet communication is materially
similar in nature to a newspaper publication or a radio broadcast. . .
216
available to the public large.”
3. AutoAdmit
Anonymity is a dimension of informational privacy—limited
access to information about personal identity. The First Amendment
217
extends to the protection of interests in anonymity on and off line.
Anonymity can be important because it furthers associational privacy
interests relating to undisclosed participation in a formal group, as in
218
the NAACP case; but anonymity can be important because it furthers the interest individuals have in freedoms of speech, expression,
and participation unrelated to organizational or group membership.
This latter sort of anonymity interest was asserted in the AutoAdmit
case, Doe I and Doe II v. Individuals, Whose True Names Are Unknown, by
anonymous Internet users who posted highly offensive comments
219
about two Yale law students on a chat-room site.
In February 2008, two Jane Doe plaintiffs who were Yale Law students issued a subpoena to AT&T Internet services for information
relating to the identity of the person assigned to the Internet protocol address from which someone using the pseudonym “AK-47” post220
ed disturbing comments about them on the AutoAdmit website.
AutoAdmit is a discussion forum popular with persons seeking, inter
alia, admission to law school, advice about how to navigate law school,
and advice and information about legal clerkships and employ221
ment.
An anonymous poster posted a message on AutoAdmit in
January 2007 in which he encouraged others to “rate this HUGE
breasted cheerful big tit girl from Yale law school” and provided a
link to an actual photograph of Jane Doe II. The synonymously designated AK-47 joined the thread that included posts asserting that
plaintiff Jane Doe II
216
217

218
219
220
221

Yath, 767 N.W.2d at 43.
See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 199–200 (1999) (holding a badge requirement removing anonymity unconstitutional); Dendrite Int’l Inc. v.
Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (holding defamation suits
may be filed against anonymous Internet speakers as “John Doe” defendants whose identities may be discovered where certain conditions are met including allegations sufficient
to survive a motion to dismiss).
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
561 F. Supp.2d 249, 251 (D. Conn. 2008).
Id. at 250.
Id. at 251.
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fantasized about being raped by her father, that she enjoyed having sex
while family members watched, that she encouraged others to punch her
in the stomach while seven months pregnant, that she had a sexually
transmitted disease, and that she had abused heroin, and a poster
222
“hope[s] she gets raped and dies.”

AK-47 posted that he or she, Jane Doe II, and two men (Alex Atkind
223
and Stephen Reynolds) were gay lovers. This case eventually settled
224
out of court, but the women plaintiffs won important victories on
two points of law. First, the court held that while anonymity online is
a constitutionally protected interest, plaintiffs who assert a plausible
case of defamation may employ subpoenas to learn the identities of
225
the individuals they seek to sue. Defendants’ motion to quash was
rejected. In another victory, the court held that Internet users sued
on account on anonymous online posts are not automatically entitled
226
to proceed anonymously into litigation.
The court found insufficient grounds for changing the default rule of identification and
227
permitting the defendants to proceed anonymously.
Some people think of the Internet as an exceptional domain in
which verbally and pictorially offensive speech should be given a wide
228
berth.
Faced with the problem of the “offensive internet,” courts
222
223
224

225

226
227
228



Doe I, 561 F. Supp.2d at 251.
Id.
Yale
Online
Slur
Lawsuit
Settled,
ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Oct.
22,
2009,
http://www.newstimes.com/news/article/Yale-online-slur-lawsuit-settled-185825.php (“A
lawyer for two former Yale University law students says they have settled their lawsuit
against several people they accused of posting sexually harassing and threatening messages about them on an Internet site. San Francisco attorney Ashok Ramani told the Hartford Courant on Wednesday that the two women settled with ‘a handful of folks’ out of
the more than 30 anonymous authors they sued and the case is over. Terms of the deal
were not disclosed. Heide Iravani and Brittan Heller, who have since graduated, sued the
message writers in U.S. District Court in Hartford, seeking at least $245,000 in punitive
damages as well as legal expenses. The lawsuit was over crude comments about them
posted on AutoAdmit, a Web message board site frequented by college students.”).
Doe I, 561 F. Supp.2d at 254–55 (citing Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 771
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (balancing the First Amendment right to autonomous
speech against the necessity of discovery, the court weighed factors including whether the
plaintiff gave notice to possible defendants, the plaintiff’s specificity concerning the offending statements, the specificity of the discovery request, the necessity of the information to advance the plaintiff’s case, the party’s expectation of privacy at the time of posting and the adequacy of the claims against the defendants)).
Doe I, 561 F. Supp.2d at 254–55.
Dendrite Int’l, Inc., 775 A.2d at 771.
An example is Adam Thierer, a research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason
University who writes about the importance of minimizing government regulation of the
Internet and warns against panicked reactions to new trends and technologies. Cf. Adam
Thierer, Cyber-Libertarianism: The Case for Real Internet Freedom, THE TECHNOLOGY
LIBERATION FRONT (Aug. 12, 2009), http://techliberation.com/2009/08/12/cyberlibertarianism-the-case-for-real-internet-freedom/ (providing an overview and history of
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have not embraced Internet exceptionalism. Instead, they have
tended to view speech that would be tortious off line as tortious on229
They have, however, embraced the notion that anonymous
line.
230
speech is a compelling, protected First Amendment interest. Those
who would sue to unmask anonymous speakers must make certain le231
People have a right to
gal and evidentiary showings in advance.
anonymous speech and that right should not be rendered meaning232
less by the subpoena power. Here is an important respect in which

229

230

231

232



“cyber-libertarianism” and its “cousin” the philosophy known as “internet exceptionalism”).
For a recent example, see, e.g., Deer Consumer Products, Inc. v. Little, 650823/2011,
2012 WL 280698 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 27, 2012) (“Included within the panoply of protections provided by the First Amendment is the right of an individual to speak anonymously. The anonymity of speech, however, is not absolute and may be limited by defamation
considerations.” (citations omitted)).
See, e.g., Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 717 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (observing that First
Amendment concerns are raised when the government seeks identities of anonymous Internet users); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005) (“It is clear that speech over
the internet is entitled to First Amendment protection. This protection extends to anonymous internet speech.” (footnotes omitted)); Indep. Newspapers v. Brodie, 966 A.2d
432, 438–41 (Md. 2009) (“Included within the panoply of protections that the First
Amendment provides is the right of an individual to speak anonymously.”); Dendrite Int’l,
Inc., 775 A.2d at 760, 765 (recognizing the “well-established First Amendment right to
speak anonymously”); In re Does 1–10, 242 S.W.3d 805, 819–20 (Tex. App. 2007) (“[A]n
author’s decision to remain anonymous . . . is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.” (citation omitted)).
See Façonnable USA Corp. v. Doe, No. 11–cv–00941–CMA–BNB, 2011 WL 2173736, at *1
(D. Colo. June 2, 2011) (“The Court finds that Skybeam has demonstrated that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor. If a stay is denied in error, Skybeam will be
required to disclose the Does’ identities, which could harm the Does’ First Amendment
right to speak anonymously.” (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, (1976) (“The loss
of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”))); see also Mem. Supp. SkyBeam Inc.’s Emergency Mot. For Stay
Pending Determination of Skybeam’s Objections to Mag. J. Boland’s Order Compelling
Skybeam to Identify Defs. at 4, Faconnable USA Corp. v. Doe, No. 11–cv–00941–CMA–
BNB,
2011
WL
2173736
(D.
Colo.
June
2,
2011),
available
at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Faconnable-v-Does-Memo-Supporting-Stay.pdf
(“[T]here is a consistent line of precedent in many different state and federal courts over
the past ten years holding that the First Amendment requires actual notice to the anonymous Internet speaker and an evidentiary showing of merit before the right to remain
anonymous may be taken away . . . . These cases represent a careful balancing of the
rights of both plaintiffs and anonymous defendants, trying to make it neither too easy to
compel identification, which could create a chilling effect on protected speech, nor too
hard for plaintiffs to pursue meritorious claims.”).
See Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (“If Internet users could be stripped of that anonymity by a civil subpoena enforced under the liberal rules of civil discovery, this would have a significant chilling effect on Internet communications and thus on basic First Amendment rights.”); see also Columbia Ins. v.
Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (“People are permitted to interact
pseudonymously and anonymously with each other so long as those acts are not in violation of the law. This ability to speak one’s mind without the burden of the other party
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privacy law has been simultaneously an instrument of social change
and stasis. The courts’ informational privacy-as-anonymity holdings
have enabled the new Internet-based technologies of social and
commercial communication to flourish. The habit of globally networked free expression represents a cultural transformation. Unfortunately, the content of the free expression this transformation has
enabled is “business and usual” when it comes to gender relations:
233
Leiter’s cesspool.
But, as the balancing of interests in anonymous speech and civil
234
prosecution found in the AutoAdmit case shows, American courts
have been careful not to allow claims of mere offense and bad taste
to, as it were, drain the cesspool. But they have facilitated civil actions, by, for example, denying that Internet subscribers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their subscriber information—
name, address, phone number, and e-mail address—conveyed to
235
their Internet service providers. Torts committed online do not get
236
a free pass on account of respect for anonymity. First Amendment
privacy law has potential as an instrument of social change and social
stasis.
V. CONCLUSION
One might wish to live in a progressively changed world in which,
first, African Americans were not burdened by legacies of legally enforced slavery and segregation; second, gays, lesbians, and bisexuals
were welcome in all corners of social, community, economic, and po-

233
234

235

236

knowing all the facts about one’s identity can foster open communication and robust debate . . . . People who have committed no wrong should be able to participate online
without fear that someone who wishes to harass or embarrass them can file a frivolous
lawsuit and thereby gain the power of the court’s order to discover their identity.”).
Leiter, supra note 170, at 155.
Cf. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 611 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 2010) (identifying standards
guiding recent courts in balancing discovery and the right to anonymous speech in commercial speech and other cases).
First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1–500, 276 F.R.D. 241, 247 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“[C]ourts
have consistently held that Internet subscribers do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their subscriber information—including name, address, phone number, and email address—as they have already conveyed such information to their ISPs.” (citation
omitted)).
Several categories of speech fall outside the protection of the first Amendment whether
they are online or offline, namely “obscenity, fraud, defamation, true threats, incitement
or speech integral to criminal conduct.” United States v. Cassidy, CRIM. RWT 11-091,
2011 WL 6260872, at *6 (D.Md. Dec. 15, 2011) (citations omitted) (finding that defendant’s blog and twitter activities caused severe emotional distress could be protected
speech).
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litical life; and, third, in which women were not so routinely assaulted
on the basis of their gender and sexuality to the detriment of their
privacy, reputations, and security. This imagined world has yet to
come fully into existence.
As this essay observes, privacy jurisprudence grounded in the First,
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments has played a singular role in
the struggle for equal rights and citizenship for African Americans,
women of all races, and gay, lesbian, and bisexual Americans. First
Amendment privacy jurisprudence has played an especially historic
237
role, starting with NAACP. But neither the associational privacy nor
238
the privacy-as-anonymity legacy of NAACP exclusively serves liberal
causes. Women, minorities, and gays may be excluded from truly private clubs, parades, or the Boy Scouts; and most online anonymous
speech viciously targeting blacks, women, and gays may have to be tolerated.
Like the 1950’s hate-mongering segregationist, venomous online
speakers today can use anonymity to shield racist, sexist, and homophobic speech. Fortunately, a number of courts have opened their
doors to lawsuits when anonymous speech crosses traditional lines of
tort and copyright liability, allowing plaintiffs to unmask offenders
239
and bring them to civil justice.
Measures limiting anonymity are
privacy jurisprudence too, and can contribute to an understanding of
privacy law as an instrument, not of harmful, hidebound tradition or
new technology-assisted freedom to hurt and offend, but of progressively liberal social change.

237
238
239

NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Id.
Some courts permit unmasking anonymous Internet posters when the tough Dendrite and
Cahill standards are met. An Illinois appeals court has rejected Dendrile and Cahill in favor
of a more generous standard in a case alleging online defamation. See Maxon v. Ottawa
Publ’g Co., 929 N.E.2d 666, 674–75 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (“There is no question that certain types of anonymous speech are constitutionally protected. However, it is overly
broad to assert that anonymous speech, in and of itself, warrants constitutional protection . . . . We find nothing in these cases to support the proposition that anonymous Internet speakers enjoy a higher degree of protection from claims of defamation than the
private individual who has a cause of action against him for defamation.” (citing Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002); Buckley v. Am.
Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n,
514 U.S. 334 (1995); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960)).

